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Abstract 
The paper provides an axiomatic characterisation of the Allanson (2017a) headcount 
stratification index, which provides a summary measure of the extent of differences between 
population groups that is directly applicable to ordinal or categorical outcome data on 
individual health status or well-being. 
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Many key questions in health policy require an evaluation of differences in the distribution of 
individual welfare across population groups, with systematic disparities in health and well-
being (simply ‘health’ hereafter) outcomes generally deemed to be socially inequitable to the 
extent that they are avoidable by reasonable action to tackle the circumstances that limit the 
chances of people in disadvantaged groups to live longer, healthier lives. For example, 
regional disparities in population health outcomes, most notably life expectancy and mortality 
rates, have been an object of official concern in the United Kingdom since at least the 
publication of the Black (1980) report. However, investigation of between-group variation in 
other health outcomes, such as self-assessed health and subjective well-being, has been held 
back by a lack of appropriate methods to deal with the qualitative nature of such measures, 
paralleling similar problems in “the evaluation of the inequality in the distribution of health 
status across individuals in a population” (Allison and Foster, 2004, p.505). In particular, 
Kobus and Miłos (2012) show that only some inequality indices for ordinal data are 
groupwise decomposable and only then under the highly restrictive condition that all 
subgroups share a common median. The main contribution of this paper is to provide an 
axiomatic characterisation of the Allanson (2017a) headcount stratification index which 
offers an alternative approach to capturing the extent of ordinal health differences between 
groups in terms of the average absolute difference in the chances of being in better rather than 
worse health as a result of being a member of one group rather than another. This measure is 
equal to twice the between-group absolute Gini index for binary health status indicators but is 
also well-defined for polytomous categorical variables.   
The concept of stratification is deeply embedded within sociology, most notably in 
relation to the analysis of social class, but has only become established in the economics 
literature following the seminal article by Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991). Key to our approach 
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is the idea that stratification, unlike segregation, implies a hierarchical ordering of population 
groups, which for the univariate or ‘pure’ measurement of health stratification will be by 
some measure of population health status. If health was cardinally measurable then, following 
Allanson (2018), this ordering might be in terms of equally distributed equivalent health, 
which reduces to ranking groups in order of mean health in the absence of inequality 
aversion. However, if the health measure is ordinal then this criterion is inoperable and some 
other basis must be found for the comparative evaluation of health profiles across groups. We 
assume that group health profiles are compared on a pairwise basis, independently of the 
health profiles of other groups, and make use of a theorem in Dubois et al. (2003) that implies 
under certain mild restrictions that only a probability-based dominance rule can serve this 
purpose if health profile preferences are characterised by ordinal invariance. We proceed to 
define a measure of the pairwise disparity between group health profiles consistent with this 
ordering criterion and then derive the stratification index as a population-weighted mean of 
pairwise disparities.  
 
2. Comparative evaluation of the population health profiles of groups. 
Consider some population that consists of G≥2 mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups. 
The population size and share of group g ( )1,....g G=  are given as gn  and g gp n N=  
respectively, where ggN n=∑  is the total population size. Let Ω be the weakly ordered, 
finite set of potential health outcomes h at the individual level. For example, the set of self-
assessed health states in survey questionnaires is commonly defined as Ω ={Very good, 
Good, Fair, Bad, Very bad}. The health profile of group g is a vector of the form 
1( , , ),gn gggH h h=   where igh  is the health status of the i’th person, and the health profile of 
the whole population 1 2( , , )U GH H H H=   is obtained as the union over all groups. We denote 
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the probability that the health of a randomly chosen individual from group g′ is at least as 
good as that of an individual chosen at random from group g as P( )g gH H′ ≥ .   
The axiomatic derivation of the probability-based dominance rule rests on a set of 
assumptions concerning the nature of preferences over the health profiles of groups. For any 
pair of groups g and g′, let the binary preference relation g gH H′   denote that “the health 
profile of group g′ is at least as good as that of group g”, where   is composed of a strict 
preference relation   and an indifference relation   as is usual. Following Dubois et al. 
(2003), this relation is assumed to be complete over homogeneous groups, such that if the 
health of everyone in groups g and g′ is h and h′  respectively then g gH H′   if h h′ ≥ , and 
reflexive. Moroever, Ω is assumed to contain at least two health states h and h′  for which 
gH ′  is strictly preferred to gH  for some pair of homogeneous groups. Finally it is assumed 
that the relation is ordinally invariant such that, for any pair of groups g and g′, changes in 
individual health outcomes that preserve the ranking of all individuals in the combined health 
distribution of the two groups will not affect whether the health profile of g′ is judged to be 
better, the same or worse than that of g.  Formally, let ( , ) ( , )g g g gH H H H
∗ ∗
′ ′≡  denote that the 
health profile pairs ( , )g gH H ′  and ( , )g gH H
∗ ∗
′  are ordinally equivalent in the sense that one 
pair can be obtained from the other by an order-preserving transformation of individual 
health outcomes in the combined profile, then ordinal invariance implies that for all ,g g G′∈
, ( ) ( )( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( )g g g g g g g gH H H H H H H H∗ ∗ ∗ ∗′ ′ ′ ′≡ ⇒ ⇔  . Ordinal invariance is the key 
property for the comparison of group health profiles if data on health outcomes is qualitative 
in nature since ranking individuals in the health distribution only requires knowledge of the 
ordering of health outcomes.   
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Given this axiomatic framework, Theorem 1 in Dubois et al. (2003, p.232), together with 
the associated Corollary 1, imply that the only basis for the comparative evaluation of pairs of 
health profiles is a probability-based dominance rule, i.e. g gH H′   if and only if 
P( ) P( )g g g gH H H H′ ′≥ ≥ ≥ . Intuitively, the comparative evaluation of the two profiles may 
be seen to involve the comparison of the health of each member of gH ′  with that of every 
member of gH . The probability-based dominance rule consists of (strictly) preferring gH ′  to 
gH  whenever the number of pairwise comparisons in which the gH ′  member’s health is at 
least good as that of the gH  member is greater than the number of comparisons in which the 
opposite condition holds. This pairwise majority rule is rational within a purely qualitative 
framework in which nothing can be said about the size of any health difference that may exist 
between any pair of individuals.  See Dubois et al. (2003) for a formal proof. 2 
The probability-based dominance rule is formally equivalent to the concept of 
statistical preference introduced by De Schuymer et al. (2003). Specifically, the health profile 
of one group may be said to be weakly statistically preferred to that of another if the (strictly) 
healthier of any randomly matched pair of individuals from the two groups is as least as 
likely to be from the first than the second group. Weak statistical preference provides a 
generalisation of weak first-degree stochastic dominance, since the latter implies the former, 
but not vice versa (De Baets and De Mayer, 2007). Statistical preference will order every 
pairs of groups, whereas stochastic dominance may not, so it will always be possible to say 
whether one group health profile is better, worse or equivalent to another. However, the 
 
2 Groups (g, g′) in this paper are equivalent to acts (f, g) in Dubois et al. (2003), potential 
health outcomes h to consequences X, and probability measures define the likelihood of 
events with the probability that individual i from group g is randomly matched with i' from g′ 
equal to 1 g gn n ′  for all i g∈  and ' 'i g∈ . 
5 
 
resultant ordering of groups need not necessarily be transitive: for example, if (5, 2, 2)gH = , 
' (3,3,3)gH =  and (4,4,1),gH ′′ =  where higher scores imply better health, then 
'P( ) 2 / 3g gH H> = , 'P( ) 2 / 3g gH H′′ > =  and P( ) 5 / 9g gH H ′′> =  thereby implying 
g gH H′  , g gH H′′ ′  but also g gH H ′′ . 
 
3. Axiomatic characterisation of the pairwise disparity between group health profiles  
The ‘natural’ measure of the pairwise disparity between group health profiles associated with 
the statistical preference criterion is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P P P Pgg g g g g g g g gH H H H H H H H′ ′ ′ ′ ′∆ = ≥ − ≥ = > − >  (1) 
where the directional measure gg′∆  is formally equivalent to both the ‘distance ratio’ D0 in 
Dagum (1980) and the first-order ‘discrimination index’ 1∆  in Le Breton et al. (2008) if 
group g′ has the better profile of the two groups. The absolute difference measure gg′∆  takes 
a minimum value of zero when ( ) ( )P Pg g g gH H H H′ ′≥ = ≥ , although this does not necessarily 
imply that the two health profiles are identical, and a maximum value of one when the least 
healthy member of one group is strictly healthier than the healthiest member of the other one. 
gg′∆  is also symmetric since 'gg g g′∆ = −∆  by construction. Nevertheless, gg′∆  is not a metric 
as it may violate the triangle inequality: for example, if (2, 2)gH = , (3,3)gH ′ =  and 
(4,1)gH ′′ =  then 1 0 0.gg gg g g′ ′′ ′′ ′∆ = > ∆ + ∆ = +    
 Krantz et al. (1971, pp.170-173) present a set of conditions for the representation of a 
binary relation such as P( ) P( )g g g gH H H H′ ′≥ ≥ ≥  in terms of absolute differences, where it is 
readily apparent that the probability-based dominance rule satisfies these axioms. In 
particular, for any ( )0,1α ∈ , the profile (1 )b g gH H Hα α ′= + −  lies between gH  and gH ′  in 
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the sense that the disparity between gH  and gH ′  is at least as great as that between bH  and 
either gH  or gH ′ : indeed gg gb bg′ ′∆ = ∆ + ∆  by definition. Krantz et al. prove that absolute-
difference measurement structures are unique up to a scale factor so the imposition of a 
maximum value of 1 as an additional normalisation condition serves to fully characterise 
.gg′∆  
 
4. Axiomatic characterisation of the headcount stratification index  
Let ( )US H  denote a cardinal headcount stratification index that is well-defined for any 
population health profile UH  and provides a measure of group separation that satisfies a 
between-group exchange principle, where this fundamental property is seen to play the same 
central role in the measurement of stratification as the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers in 
the measurement of inequality (see Bleichrodt and van Doorslaer, 2006). The univariate 
version of this principle holds that an exchange of group membership between an individual 
from one group and an individual in worse or equal health from some other group with a 
worse health profile will not lead to an increase in stratification provided that the exchange 
does not affect the ordering of groups. Let 1( , , ,..., ,..., )
X X X
U Gg gH H H H H′ ′′=   denote a health 
profile with an identical ordering of groups by population health to UH , where 
X
UH  is 
obtained from UH  by an exchange in group membership between an individual with health 
h+  from group g′′  and someone with health h−  from group g′. The exchange principle then 
implies that ( ) ( )XU US H S H≥  for all ,g G∈  g gH H′′ ′ , h h
+ −≥ . In particular, the principle 
follows naturally from the positive association of individual and population health values (cf. 
Arrow, 1951) if the population consists only of the two groups g′′  and g′, since the disparity 
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between the health profiles of the two groups may be expected to fall, and cannot rise, as a 
result of the exchange given that Xg gH H′′ ′′  and ' '
X
g gH H  by definition if h h
+ −≥ .  
We proceed to define ( )US H  as a population-weighted mean of the set of absolute 
difference measures gg′∆ . It is natural to assume that ( )US H  is symmetric with respect to 
both individuals and groups conditional on group membership, such that it is invariant to the 
permutation both of any two individuals within any group and of any two groups within the 
population. Consistency in aggregation then implies (see Diewert, 1993) that ( )US H  must be 
written as a separable mean of the form: 
( ) ( )( )








g g ggg g
G G G
g g gg g gg g g
S H p p
p p p S H
φ φ










where φ  is a continuous, increasing function of one variable and ( )UgS H  provides a 
symmetric measure of the contribution of group g to overall stratification. ( )US H  is a unit 
free measure that is invariant to rank-preserving transformations of health outcomes but 
sensitive to any change in individual health status within the population unless the change is 
over some health range occupied exclusively by members of the same group as the 
individual. 
Further structure is imposed on φ  by the between-group exchange principle. In 
particular, if the ordering of groups is transitive then φ  must be linear if it is a differentiable 
function. To see the call for this condition note that the membership exchange envisaged by 
the principle will not only lead to a change in pairwise stratification between the two groups 
involved in the swap, g′′  and g′, but also between this pair of groups and every other group.  
Let ab∂ ∆  denote the change in pairwise stratification between any two groups a and b as a 
result of the membership exchange then the principle requires that: 
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( ) ( ) ( )( )




a a a b aba a b
G G
a b ab ab aba b






∂ = ∂ = ∂ ∆





( ) ( )sgn sgn )g g g gg g g g
g g g g
g g g g
np np n n
θ θ θ θ′ ′′ ′ ′′
′ ′′ ′′ ′
′′ ′ ′′ ′
        
′ ′′ ′ ′′∂ ∆ = ∂ ∆ = − + − = − +                        
;   
sgn( ) ; ,aag
g






′′ ′ ′′∂ ∆ = − ≠  
 
;     sgn( ) ; ,aag
g






′ ′ ′′∂ ∆ = − ≠  
 
 
0; , ,ab ba a b g g′ ′′∂ ∆ = ∂ ∆ = ≠ ;       0;aa a G∂ ∆ = ∀ ∈ ; 
 





a a a a
h h











and ( )Sφ∂  and ( )gSφ∂  are the changes in the transformed overall and groupwise indices 
respectively.  
 For (3) to hold for any possible partition of the population not only requires that 
g g′ ′′∂ ∆  is non-positive, which will be true by definition, but also that for all other groups 
,g g g′ ′′≠ :   
( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ){ } 0; ,g g gg gg gg g gg gg ggS p p g g gφ φ φ φ φ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′′∂ = ∆ + ∂ ∆ − ∆ + ∆ + ∂ ∆ − ∆ ≤ ≠
  (4) 
which may in turn be approximated to an infinite order, assuming differentiability, as the sum 
of two signed Taylor-series expansions: 
( )
( ) ( )
1 1








p g g p g g
j np j np
φ




   ∆ ∆      ′′ ′≈ − + − ≤                  
∑ ∑
where, for { },b g g′′ ′= , ( )j gbφ ∆  is the j’th derivative of φ  with respect to ( )g bnpθ  
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evaluated at gb∆ . Three distinct cases can be identified if the ordering of the groups is 
transitive: (I) if _g g gH H H′′ ′   then 0gg′′∂ ∆ ≥  and 0gg′∂ ∆ ≤  such that linearity of φ  is 
required to ensure that the net change in stratification with respect to group g is non-positive. 
In particular, linearity implies that ( )gSφ  is invariant to the membership swap since
( ) ( ) ( )( )1 0g g g g g g gS p np p npφ β θ θ′′ ′′ ′ ′∂ = − =  if ( ) 0 1g gS Sφ β β= + . Otherwise, 
( )gSφ∂  may be either positive or negative depending on the group populations shares gp ′′  
and 'gp ; (II) if _g g gH H H′′ ′   then 0gg′′∂ ∆ ≤  and 0gg′∂ ∆ ≥ , such that the need for φ  to 
be linear follows by a similar argument based on the invariance of ( )gSφ ; (III) if 
_ _g g gH H H′′ ′   then both 0gg′′∂ ∆ ≤  and 0gg′∂ ∆ ≤  such that the required non-positivity 
of ( )gSφ∂  follows immediately. 
 Dropping transitivity of the ordering admits a further case: (IV) if g gH H′′ ′  and
g gH H′   but g gH H ′′  then both 0gg′′∂ ∆ ≥  and 0gg′∂ ∆ ≥  by construction, thereby 
opening up the possibility for violations of the between-group membership principle even if 
φ  is linear. For example, if (5, 4, 4,1)gH ′′ = , (4,3,3,3)gH ′ =  and 
(5,5,5, 4, 2, 2, 2, 2)gH =  then 3 / 8g g′ ′′∆ =  and 1/ 32gg′∆ =  but 1/ 32gg′′∆ = − . Hence 
1/ 32S =  for any linear φ , given 0gg g g g g′ ′ ′′ ′′∆ = ∆ = ∆ =  by definition, but this rises to 
3/64 if the healthiest person in group g′′  swaps groups with the healthiest person in group g′. 
In general, a membership swap will lead to violations of the principle in the nontransitive 
case if the change in S due to the increase in pairwise stratification with respect to groups 
with profiles better than g′′  but worse than g′ more than offsets the change due to the 
reduction in pairwise stratification with respect to both the two groups involved in the swap 
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and all other groups with health profiles better than g′ and worse than g′′ . For the simplest 
case of a population that consists only of the 3 groups forming the statistical preference cycle 
then this condition implies that violations will occur if: 
( )g g g g g g g g g g gp p p p p′ ′ ′′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′ ′′∂ ∆ + ∂ ∆ > − ∂ ∆  (5) 
where the identity of group g may be arbitrarily chosen to be any one of the three groups and 
with the membership swap then assumed to takes place between the other two groups. The 
strict inequality will hold if: 
( )2 g g g g g gn n nθ θ θ′ ′ ′′ ′′> +  (6) 





a a a a
h h h h





   
   = = + = >
   
   
∑ ∑  is equal to the sum 
of the number of group a members in the overlapping closed intervals , 1h h h− + = −   and 
1,h h h− + = +  . Thus the inequality must hold for at least one choice of group g from the 
three groups, implying violation of the between-group exchange principle if the associated 
membership swap between the other two groups is both feasible and preserves the ordering of 
groups, unless g g g g g gn n nθ θ θ′ ′ ′′ ′′= = . More generally, the condition implies that violations 
will occur if ( )2 2
g g g g
g g g g g g g gg G g Gn n n nθ θ θ θ⊕ ⊗′′ ′ ′′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′′∈ ∈≥ + +∑ ∑ , where g gG
⊕
′′ ′  is the sub-set 
of groups with profiles better than g′′  but worse than g′ and g gG
⊗
′′ ′ consists of groups with 
profiles better than g′ and worse than g′′ . 
 Finally, no further loss of generality is entailed by restricting φ  to be the identity 
function since all linear φ  generate the same value of the stratification index S.  Interest may 
therefore be confined to the index proposed by Allanson (2017a): 
( )1 1 1 1 1G G G G Gg g gg g g gg g gg g g g gS p p p p p S′ ′ ′ ′′ ′= = = = == ∆ = ∆ =∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ;  (5) 
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The bounds of S in (5) are the closed interval 2[0, (1 )]gg p−∑ : dividing through by 
2(1 )gg p−∑  yields a normalised index that is the population-weighted mean level of 
pairwise stratification between all mutually distinct groups, with a minimum value of zero 
and a maximum of one.  This normalised index is both linear homogenous and translatable in 
the sense that a proportional change in all pairwise disparities gg′∆  between distinct groups 
will lead to an equiproportionate change in the index, whereas a unit change in all such 
pairwise disparities would lead to a unit change in the index.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The paper provides a characterisation of the Allanson (2017a) headcount stratification index, 
which is defined as the population-weighted mean difference in the probabilities that the 
healthier of any randomly chosen pair of individuals will be from the group with the better 
rather than worse population health. The approach is motivated by the concept of statistical 
preference (De Schuymer et al., 2003) which, following Dubois et al. (2003), can be shown to 
provide the only basis for the pairwise comparison of group health profiles if individual 
health is only ordinal measurable.  
We further propose a between-group exchange principle as the fundamental property 
of a headcount stratification index, with this playing the same role as the Pigou-Dalton 
principle of transfers in the measurement of inequality. It is shown that the principle restricts 
interest to the Allanson index if the ordering of groups is transitive, although violations are all 
but inevitable for at least some membership exchanges within subsets of groups forming 
statistical preference cycles of order 3.  However transitivity may be expected to hold in most 
empirical work if the shape of the group health profiles is not too irregular, with Allanson 
(2017a) obtaining a strict total order of regional health profiles in the United Kingdom.  
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Our between-group exchange principle is a ‘global’ condition unlike the ‘local’ 
version identified by Reardon (2009) as a characteristic of a class of vertical segregation 
indices that measure the extent to which ordinal variation within subgroups is less than the 
total ordinal variation in the population. Allanson (2017b) labels an analogous property in the 
measurement of income-related health stratification as a “health status” exchange condition 
but it is perhaps more natural to think of a switch in group membership between two 
individuals, for example by migration between regions, than in health status. Moreover, a so-
called ‘Hammond’ transfer that merely reduced the spread of health between the two 
individuals (cf. Gravel et al., 2020) with no exchange in group membership would not in 
general be guaranteed to reduce stratification since S may increase as a result if, for example, 
the stratification of the first group did not change while that of the less healthy group 
increased in relation to other groups with even worse health profiles. 
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